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ARTICLE
Daniel D.Tostrud
“Payability” as the Logical Corollary to “Collectibility” in
Legal Malpractice
Abstract.
The collectibility requirement as part of the legal
malpractice plaintiff’s affirmative case is well-established and regarded by
most courts as a critical part of the plaintiff’s proof of proximate causation.
Conversely, where the legal malpractice plaintiff was the defendant in the
underlying lawsuit, to be successful in the malpractice suit, the plaintiff
must prove that it had a meritorious defense that would have made a
difference to the outcome of the case had the lawyer properly asserted and
pursued the defense.
Prompted by the conflicting opinions of two federal courts on this issue,
courts have begun to discuss whether the judgment debtor turned legal
malpractice plaintiff should also have to prove the ability to pay all or part
of the judgment entered against it to recover the amount of the judgment
as damages in a legal malpractice action. This Article joins that
conversation and discusses the competing views on adopting a payability
requirement for legal malpractice claims.
Author. B.B.A., University of Mary Hardin-Baylor; J.D., Baylor
University. Mr. Tostrud is a member in the law firm of Cobb Martinez
Woodward PLLC in Dallas, Texas. For over 23 years, Mr. Tostrud has
devoted the vast majority of his law practice to representing lawyers,
accountants, and other professionals on malpractice claims, administrative
proceedings, and fee disputes. Mr. Tostrud gratefully acknowledges the
assistance of his colleague, Lindsey K. Griffin, in the preparation of this
Article.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The collectibility requirement as part of the legal malpractice plaintiff’s
affirmative case is well-established and regarded by most courts as a critical
part of the plaintiff’s proof of proximate causation.1 On the other hand,
to be successful in the subsequent malpractice suit where the legal
malpractice plaintiff was the defendant in the underlying lawsuit, the
plaintiff must prove that he or she had a meritorious defense that would
have made a difference to the outcome of the case had the lawyer properly
asserted and pursued the defense.2 In adopting these requirements, courts
have made a strategic effort to avoid a windfall opportunity for a legal
malpractice plaintiff who did not suffer any actual damages as a result of
the lawyer’s negligence.3 Nevertheless, is that enough?
Prompted by the conflicting opinions of two federal courts on this
issue,4 courts have begun to discuss whether the judgment debtor turned
legal malpractice plaintiff should also have to prove the ability to pay all or
part of the judgment entered against him or her in order to recover the
amount of the judgment as damages in a legal malpractice action.5 This
Article joins that conversation and discusses the competing views on
adopting a payability requirement for legal malpractice claims.
This Article begins with a review of the collectibility requirement,
including the policy behind the requirement and the majority versus the
minority rule on collectibility. Second, this Article looks at the
meritorious defense requirement for the legal malpractice plaintiff who
suffered a judgment in the underlying lawsuit. Next, the Article focuses on

1. See Cosgrove v. Grimes, 774 S.W.2d 662, 665 (Tex. 1989) (explaining the elements of a
cause of action for legal malpractice); Blanks v. Shaw, 89 Cal. Rptr. 3d 710, 725 (Ct. App. 2009)
(listing the elements for professional negligence in a civil malpractice case); Lindenman v. Kreitzer,
775 N.Y.S.2d 4, 8 (App. Div. 2004) (commenting on the plaintiff’s burden of proof when suing for
legal malpractice).
2. See Md. Cas. Co. v. Price, 231 F. 397, 403 (4th Cir. 1916) (requiring the plaintiff to show
that he could have avoided the judgment entered against him were it not for the malpractice of his
lawyer).
3. See McKenna v. Forsyth & Forsyth, 720 N.Y.S.2d 654, 658 (App. Div. 2001) (declaring the
injuries the plaintiff suffered from the accident were separate from whatever loss the defendant
incurred as a result of the defendants’ failure to file a suit after the accident, and only the former were
recoverable for legal malpractice).
4. See McClarty v. Gudenau, 176 B.R. 788, 793 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1995) (holding that a
debtor cannot recover damages for a judgment that has been discharged); Stanley v. Trinchard, 500
F.3d 411, 430–31 (5th Cir. 2007) (ruling that a trustee was not barred from pursuing damages
despite the existence of a bankruptcy discharge).
5. Smith v. Haden, 868 F. Supp. 1, 2–3 (D.D.C. 1994) (determining that the plaintiff did not
have to prove that the underlying judgment was collectible in order to recover).
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two federal court opinions, McClarty v. Gudeanu6 from the Eastern
District of Michigan and Stanley v. Trinchard7 from the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals, wherein the courts expressed opposite views on whether
a legal malpractice plaintiff—who will never have to pay the judgment
entered against it in the underlying lawsuit—should be able to collect the
amount of the judgment as damages for legal malpractice. This study will
include a look back at the debate over the judgment rule versus the
payment rule and the various compromises courts have made in adopting
one rule or the other. Finally, the Article concludes with a discussion
about why a payability requirement makes sense as a corollary to the
collectibility requirement in legal malpractice cases.
II. BASIC ELEMENTS OF PROOF FOR A LEGAL MALPRACTICE CLAIM
The elements of legal malpractice are well-established and shared among
the various states.8 According to the court in Cosgrove v. Grimes,9 to
establish a claim for legal malpractice, “[t]he plaintiff must prove that there
is a duty owed to him by the defendant, a breach of that duty, that the
breach proximately caused the plaintiff injury and that damages
occurred.”10 Proximate cause consists of two elements: (1) cause-in-fact
and (2) foreseeability.11 According to Doe v. Boys Club of Greater Dallas,
Inc.,12 cause-in-fact, also referred to as the “but for” test, is “whether the
negligent ‘act or omission was a substantial factor in bringing about
injury,’ without which the harm would have not occurred.”13
The essential question for a legal malpractice claim is whether a
reasonable and prudent strategy and course of action by the lawyer would
have led to a different result in the underlying litigation. A simple error in
judgment will generally not constitute malpractice.14 Moreover, the
6. McClarty v. Gudenau, 176 B.R. 788 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1995).
7. Stanley v. Trinchard, 500 F.3d 411 (5th Cir. 2007).
8. Cosgrove v. Grimes, 774 S.W.2d 662, 665 (Tex. 1989) (“The plaintiff must prove that there
is a duty owed to him by the defendant, a breach of that duty, that the breach proximately caused the
plaintiff injury and that damages occurred.”); Blanks v. Shaw, 89 Cal. Rptr. 3d 710, 725 (Ct. App.
2009) (listing the same four elements for civil malpractice cases that are listed in Cosgrove);
Lindenman v. Kreitzer, 775 N.Y.S.2d 4, 6–9 (App. Div. 2004) (examining the elements of a
malpractice claim).
9. Cosgrove v. Grimes, 774 S.W.2d 662 (Tex. 1989).
10. Id. at 665.
11. Doe v. Boys Club of Greater Dallas, Inc., 907 S.W.2d 472, 477 (Tex. 1995).
12. Doe v. Boys Club of Greater Dallas, Inc., 907 S.W.2d 472 (Tex. 1995).
13. Id. at 477 (quoting Prudential Ins. Co. v. Jefferson Assocs., Ltd, 896 S.W.2d 156, 161
(Tex. 1995)).
14. See Blanks v. Shaw, 89 Cal. Rptr. 3d 710, 725 (Ct. App. 2009) (stating that the plaintiff
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attorney’s mere selection of one option among a number of reasonable and
prudent options is not malpractice. The court in Cosgrove v. Grimes held
that “[i]f an attorney makes a decision which a reasonably prudent attorney
could make in the same or similar circumstance, it is not an act of
negligence even if the result is undesirable.”15 Cosgrove further stated,
“[t]he standard is an objective exercise of professional judgment, not the
subjective belief that his acts are in good faith.”16 Attorneys cannot be
held strictly liable for imperfect decisions or for unfulfilled client
expectations.17 The fact finder must evaluate the attorney’s conduct based
upon the information available to the attorney at the time they made their
decision.18 Thus, legal malpractice cannot be based on Monday morning
quarterbacking.
In addition to the standard elements for any negligence claim, the legal
malpractice plaintiff who loses a cause of action because of their attorney’s
negligence faces a higher burden. Known as the suit-within-a-suit, casewithin-a-case, or trial-within-a-trial requirement, this doctrine serves as a
procedural and evidentiary tool for addressing the proximate causation
element of a plaintiff’s legal malpractice claim, and requires the plaintiff to
prove that but for the lawyer’s misconduct, he or she would have been
successful in the underlying action.19 This burden is a distinctive feature
unique to legal malpractice claims that adds an extra layer to proving
proximate causation.20
has the burden to show he or she would have achieved a more favorable outcome in the underlying
cause of action had the defendant lawyer not breached his or her duty owed to the plaintiff); see also
Cosgrove, 774 S.W.2d at 664 (declaring that errors in judgment may not be malpractice if the error
was made in good faith).
15. Cosgrove, 774 S.W.2d at 665.
16. Id. (holding that legal malpractice liability is based on an objective standard); see also
Ambriz v. Kelegian, 53 Cal. Rptr. 3d 700, 708 (Ct. App. 2007) (detailing the fundamental burdens
of proof for a plaintiff in a legal malpractice case); Crestwood Cove Apartments Bus. Trust v. Turner,
164 P.3d 1247, 1253–54 (Utah 2007) (comparing various standards in determining whether an
attorney acted negligently).
17. See Cosgrove, 774 S.W.2d at 664 (contending that attorneys should not be liable for every
mistake or lost case).
18. See id. (noting the basis of the attorney evaluation in a legal malpractice claim).
19. See Blanks, 89 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 725 (describing the dynamics of the “trial-within-a-trial
method”); see also Tri-G, Inc. v. Burke, Bosselman & Weaver, 856 N.E.2d 389, 395 (Ill. 2006)
(noting that the idea of a legal malpractice action is to redress an actual harm); Lindenman v.
Kreitzer, 775 N.Y.S.2d 4, 8 (App. Div. 2004) (finding that a malpractice action must be based on
actual harm); Ballesteros v. Jones, 985 S.W.2d 485, 489 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1998, pet.
denied) (“Because the plaintiff must establish that the underlying suit would have been won ‘but for’
the attorney’s breach of duty, this ‘suit within a suit’ requirement is necessarily a component of the
plaintiff’s burden on cause in fact.”).
20. See Lindenman, 775 N.Y.S.2d at 8 (“It is only after the plaintiff has proved the case within

10 TOSTRUD_GRIFFIN_FINAL_GERMANO_CLEAN

2014]

“Payability” as the Logical Corollary to “Collectibility”

6/24/2014 11:28 AM

413

The suit-within-a-suit burden is, without question, significant for legal
malpractice plaintiffs.21 In essence, the plaintiff must win two trials: the
underlying litigation and the subsequent malpractice suit.22 Without it,
however, the legal malpractice plaintiff could prevail based on “malpractice
in a vacuum.”23 As the California Supreme Court stated, “The purpose of
this requirement, which has been in use for more than 120 years, is to
safeguard against speculative and conjectural claims.”24 The suit-within-asuit requirement requires the plaintiff to prove by factual evidence, rather
than by supposition of what might have happened in the underlying
lawsuit absent the attorney’s negligence.25 It ensures that the legal
malpractice plaintiff recovers only his or her actual damages caused by the
malpractice.26 After all, that is the essence of awarding compensatory
damages to a tort victim.
III. THE COLLECTIBILITY REQUIREMENT
A. The Policy Behind Requiring Proof of Collectibility
In the majority of states, in order to meet the suit-within-a-suit
requirement, the plaintiff must prove what is known as “collectibility.”27
the case, including the value of the lost judgment, that the issue of collectibility may arise.”).
21. See id. (considering the heavy burden of the suit-within-a-suit requirement).
22. See, e.g., McKenna v. Forsyth & Forsyth, 720 N.Y.S.2d 654, 656 (App. Div. 2001) (noting
that legal malpractice plaintiffs have to prosecute two lawsuits and essentially recreate the underlying
action to prevail); see also Benjamin H. Barton, Do Judges Systematically Favor the Interests of the Legal
Profession?, 59 ALA. L. REV. 453, 493 (2008) (“[C]ausation requires the malpractice plaintiff to win
two trials: the original litigation and the later malpractice suit.”).
23. See Schneider v. Richardson, 411 A.2d 656, 658 (Me. 1979) (contending that the suitwithin-a-suit requirement arose from the policy that “mere negligence on the part of an attorney is
not sufficient to impose liability,” unless the client suffered actual damages as a result of the
malpractice).
24. Viner v. Sweet, 70 P.3d 1046, 1052 (Cal. 2003) (citing Mattco Forge, Inc. v. Arthur
Young & Co., 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 780 (1997)).
25. See Law Offices of Lawrence J. Stockler, PC v. Rose, 436 N.W.2d 70, 77 (Mich. 1989)
(providing that the suit-within-a-suit requirement should “satisfy the requirement that the client
prove damages based on factual evidence”).
26. In Viner, the court noted that without the suit-within-a-suit requirement, it would be
entirely too easy for the legal malpractice plaintiff to make the lawyer a scapegoat for the deal or
lawsuit that did not go as planned. See Viner, 70 P.3d at 1052. To avoid this, courts must pay close
attention to the cause-in-fact element and deny recovery where the unfavorable result likely would
have occurred regardless of the malpractice, or where the result was caused by the client’s own lapse
in judgment. Id. at 1051–52.
27. See McKenna, 720 N.Y.S.2d at 657 (reasoning that the plaintiff must show the defendant’s
negligence caused actual damages that the court can remedy in legal malpractice litigation); see also
Cosgrove v. Grimes, 774 S.W.2d 662, 666 (Tex. 1989) (“The two issues should have inquired as to
the amount of damages recoverable and collectible from Stephens if the suit had been properly
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This means proof that but for the attorney’s negligence, the plaintiff would
have prevailed in the underlying lawsuit and would have been able to
collect on the judgment.28 In Texas, for example, the legal malpractice
plaintiff must prove that he or she would have recovered a judgment for a
specific amount had the attorney handled the underlying case properly.29
In enforcing the collectibility requirement, the court in McKenna v.
Forsyth & Forsyth30 reasoned that “[l]imiting damages in a legal
malpractice action to the amount of collectible judgment” in the
underlying lawsuit “is consistent with the purpose of compensatory
damages, i.e., ‘to make the injured client whole.’”31 To hold otherwise
would give former clients a windfall opportunity to be in a better position
because of the legal malpractice action than they would have been in
following the underlying lawsuit.32 As a matter of fairness, it would be
inequitable for the malpractice plaintiff to recover a judgment against the
attorney for an amount greater than what the plaintiff would have
recovered and collected in the underlying lawsuit.33 The damages in a
legal malpractice case for a lost cause of action are what the legal
malpractice plaintiff would have recovered and been able to pocket had the
underlying suit been properly prosecuted.34 The collectibility requirement
achieves this damage result for the former client.
Courts require strict proof of collectibility.35 Proof of collectibility may
include the fair market value of the defendant’s net assets that would have
been subject to payment of the judgment, evidence of the judgment
debtor’s financial status sufficient to pay the judgment, or the amount that
prosecuted.”).
28. E.g., Cosgrove, 774 S.W.2d at 666 (finding evidence that the plaintiff had been adversely
affected by the negligent actions of his lawyer).
29. See Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld, LLP v. Nat’l Dev. & Research Corp., 299 S.W.3d
106, 109 (Tex. 2009) (holding that there was insufficient evidence to calculate damages).
30. McKenna v. Forsyth & Forsyth, 720 N.Y.S.2d 654 (App. Div. 2001).
31. Id. at 657 (quoting Campagnola v. Mulholland, Minion & Roe, 555 N.E.2d 611, 613
(N.Y. 1990)) (discussing the fairness and consistency of limiting damages of legal malpractice to
collectible judgments).
32. See id. (stressing the inequity of allowing a recovery that would exceed the collectible
damages of the underlying action in a malpractice suit).
33. See Lavigne v. Chase, Haskell, Hayes & Kalamon, P.S., 50 P.3d 306, 309 (Wash. App.
2002) (“In the legal malpractice context, proximate cause boils down to whether the client would
have fared better but for the attorney’s negligence.” (citing Daugert v. Pappas, 704 P.2d 600, 603
(Wash. 1985) (en banc))).
34. See Hartford Cas. Ins. Co. v. Farrish-LeDuc, 882 A.2d 44, 50 (Conn. 2005) (justifying the
court’s reward of damages by concluding that they are equal to the damages that would have been
recovered had the malpractice not been committed).
35. See, e.g., id. at 53 (limiting the damages recovered by the plaintiff in her malpractice suit to
the exact dollar amount she would have recovered in her personal injury claim).
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would have been paid on the judgment by another, such as by a guarantor
or insurer.36 Proof that a defendant in the underlying lawsuit could have
satisfied a judgment prior to when it was signed is not probative of
collectibility for the subsequent malpractice action unless the plaintiff also
proves that the underlying defendant could have satisfied the judgment at
the time of entry.37
For example, in Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld, LLP v. National
Development & Research Corp.,38 the Texas Supreme Court held that
evidence showing the defendant in the underlying lawsuit “owned
numerous subsidiaries with hundreds of millions of dollars” in assets was
not sufficient to show that the defendant itself had sufficient assets to pay
the lost judgment.39 In addition, several pieces of the evidence brought
forward to prove collectibility dated back to before the judgment was
signed; therefore, they did not constitute evidence of collectibility as of the
date the judgment was entered.40 Absent sufficient proof of collectibility,
Akin Gump’s former client could not recover damages for its legal
malpractice claim in the amount of the judgment it lost as a result of the
lawyer’s negligence.41
On the other hand, in DiPalma v. Seldman,42 the California Court of
Appeals held that evidence that the judgment debtors in the underlying
action had a $700,000 mortgage from the sale of a piece of property,
$237,000 in refinancing proceeds, an equity interest in thirty to forty
properties, twelve to eighteen construction projects currently in progress,
and $30,000 from the auctioning of a restaurant in bankruptcy, was
sufficient to prove collectibility of a judgment with a balance of less than

36. See Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld, LLP v. Nat’l Dev. & Research Corp., 299 S.W.3d
106, 109 (Tex. 2009) (comparing the difference between the collectible funds and the damages that
would have paid from the underlying defendant’s net assets, and holding that the difference was
grounds for reversal); see also Fernandes v. Barrs, 641 So. 2d 1371, 1376 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994)
(listing possible ways a plaintiff may prove that the original tortfeasor would have had the funds to
award the original damages).
37. See Akin, 299 S.W.3d at 113–14 (concluding that evidence of wealth before a final
judgment is irrelevant and therefore not probative, except in cases where the defendant continued to
have sufficient funds).
38. Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld, LLP v. Nat’l Dev. & Research Corp., 299 S.W.3d
106 (Tex. 2009).
39. See id. at 112–15 (pointing out that pre-judgment evidence of solvency should be sufficient
in most instances to prove collectibility).
40. See id. at 116–18 (summarizing that none of the evidence cited by the respondent was
“legally sufficient to prove collectibility of damages it would have been awarded”).
41. Id. at 111.
42. DiPalma v. Seldman, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 219 (Ct. App. 1994).
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$200,000.43 Specifically, the court held that as a result of the evidence set
forth above, “a complexion of some solvency [was] suggested” to establish
collectibility of the judgment.44 Regardless of the jurisdiction, proof of
collectibility is a steep burden.45
B. Majority Versus Minority Rule
The majority rule is that the legal malpractice plaintiff has the burden of
proof to establish collectibility.46 Proof of collectibility as part of the legal
malpractice plaintiff’s burden to prove proximate causation is the rule in
several states, including Texas, California, Florida, and New York.47
For example, in McKenna v. Forsyth & Forsyth, McKenna filed a legal
43. See id. at 224–25 (declaring that ownership of a mortgage, property interests, and other
funds were sufficient to evidence collectibility of a judgment).
44. Id. at 225 (quoting Walker v. Porter, 118 Cal. Rptr. 468, 470 (Ct. App. 1974)).
45. See Klump v. Duffus, 71 F.3d 1368, 1374 (7th Cir. 1995) (describing the difficult burden
of proof required of the plaintiff).
46. See id. (taking the majority position in holding that the plaintiff has the burden to show
collectibility); DiPalma, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 220–21 (“A plaintiff who establishes legal malpractice in
prosecuting a claim must also prove careful management would have resulted in a favorable judgment
and collection of same.” (citations omitted)); Fernandes v. Barrs, 641 So. 2d 1371, 1375 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1994) (citing the general rule that the legal malpractice plaintiff must prove both that he
would have achieved a favorable result but for the attorney’s negligence, and also that the judgment
to which he was entitled would have been collectible); Allen Decorating v. Oxendine, 483 S.E.2d
298, 301 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997) (affirming that a former client in a legal malpractice claim against his
attorney has the burden of proof to show that his prior claim was valid, and that the court would
have rendered a favorable, collectible judgment, in order for the court to award him damages); Kohler
v. Woollen, Brown & Hawkins, 304 N.E.2d 677, 679 (Ill. App. Ct. 1973) (requiring the plaintiff to
show the legitimacy of the lost claim that could have been realized if not for the attorney’s
negligence); Poly v. Moylan, 667 N.E.2d 250, 255 (Mass. 1996) (determining that a legal
malpractice plaintiff is limited to recovering damages from “what he could have collected from the
defendant in the underlying [action] but for the attorney’s negligence”); McKenna v. Forsyth &
Forsyth, 720 N.Y.S.2d 654, 657 (App. Div. 2001) (“It has long been the rule in New York that
damages recoverable in [a] legal malpractice action are limited to the amount that ‘could or would
have been collected’ in the underlying action.” (quoting Schimitt v. McMillan, 162 N.Y.S. 437, 439
(App. Div. 1916))); Little v. Matthewson, 442 S.E.2d 567, 571 (N.C. Ct. App. 1994) (stating that a
legal malpractice plaintiff must prove that the underlying claim was valid, that it would have resulted
in a judgment in the plaintiff’s favor, and that the judgment would have been collectible), aff’d, 455
S.E.2d 160 (N.C. 1995); Tilly v. Doe, 746 P.2d 323, 326 (Wash. Ct. App. 1987) (holding “the trial
court did not err in requiring proof of collectibility” from the plaintiff because the legal malpractice
plaintiff has the burden of proof).
47. See DiPalma, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 220–21 (affirming the collectibility requirement in a legal
malpractice claim); Fernandes, 641 So. 2d at 1375 (mandating the plaintiff show both “that a
favorable result would have been achieved in the underlying litigation” and that any judgment
rendered would have been collectible); McKenna, 720 N.Y.S.2d at 655 (noting the majority rule,
which places the burden of proof of collectibility on the plaintiff). See generally Ballesteros v. Jones,
985 S.W.2d 485 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1998, pet. denied) (explaining the necessity of the
collectibility requirement in a legal malpractice action).
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malpractice action against his lawyers after they failed to file a personal
injury lawsuit within the statute of limitations.48 The trial court ordered a
bifurcated trial so the jury could hear the issue of liability and damages in
the first case, and the issue of potential collectible damages in the
second.49 At the end of the first phase, the jury found that McKenna had
sustained damages in excess of $500,000 as a result of the car accident.50
During the second phase of the trial, the lawyer-defendants presented
evidence that the limit of the underlying defendant’s liability coverage was
$50,000 and ultimately the defendant would have had to file bankruptcy
to pay the $500,000 verdict against him.51 Accordingly, the jury found
that the amount that would have been collectible by McKenna in the
underlying lawsuit was $50,000, and the trial court entered judgment
against the lawyer-defendants in that amount.52 In reviewing the trial
court’s judgment, the New York Appellate Court held that the loss
sustained by McKenna related to the car accident was separate and distinct
from the loss resulting from the lawyers’ malpractice in failing to timely
file the lawsuit.53 Thus, it was proper for the trial court to limit the
judgment against the defendants to the amount that would have been
collectible by McKenna in the underlying personal injury case.54 In
addition, the trial court properly placed the burden to prove collectibility
on McKenna.55 The appellate court held that doing so was neither unfair
nor illogical, because proof of collectibility is part of the plaintiff’s case for
legal malpractice.56
In contrast, a minority of courts have held that collectibility is an
affirmative defense that must be pled and proven by the lawyer-

48. See McKenna, 720 N.Y.S.2d at 655–56 (affirming the $50,000 judgment against
McKenna’s lawyers as the collectible amount in the underlying lawsuit).
49. See id. at 656 (defining the procedures of each phase of the legal malpractice lawsuit).
50. Id.
51. See id. (“Defendants presented evidence that the limit of Schoenhardt’s liability coverage at
the time of the accident was $50,000 . . . that Schoenhardt would not be able to pay a judgment of
$500,000 and that he would have declared bankruptcy if a judgment in that amount were entered
against him.”).
52. Id.
53. Id. at 657.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. See McKenna v. Forsyth & Forsyth, 720 N.Y.S.2d 655, 658 (App. Div. 2001) (affirming
the majority opinion of the courts concerning the plaintiff’s burden of proof of collectibility); see also
Benjamin H. Barton, Do Judges Systematically Favor the Interests of the Legal Profession?, 59 ALA. L.
REV. 453, 492 (2008) (“The majority of courts add a second caveat as well: the plaintiff must prove
that she would have won the underlying judgment and collected it.”).
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defendant.57 Courts adopting the minority rule have done so with a
sympathetic attitude towards the twice-wronged legal malpractice plaintiff
who faces a steep burden to recover any damages.58 The minority-view
courts have criticized proof of collectibility as part of the plaintiff’s burden
of proof on several grounds: (1) it “ignores the possibility of a settlement
[between the underlying parties], either before or after judgment[;]” (2)
over time, the judgment debtor’s financial situation may improve, making
it possible to pay the judgment, and judgments may typically be executed
over number of years; (3) having a fact finder render a judgment on the
merits in a party’s favor is itself an indication that the party’s claim has
value regardless of collectibility of the underlying judgment; and (4)
placing the burden to prove collectibility on the plaintiff would be unduly
burdensome.59 Despite this minority view, most courts today continue to
view collectibility as part of the legal malpractice plaintiff’s affirmative
case.60
IV. PROOF OF PROXIMATE CAUSE ON THE DEFENSE SIDE: THE
MERITORIOUS DEFENSE REQUIREMENT
Plaintiffs who were on the other side of the docket in the underlying
57. See Smith v. Haden, 868 F. Supp. 1, 2–3 (D.D.C. 1994) (holding that it is not necessary
for the plaintiff to prove collectibility of the underlying judgment to which he or she was entitled);
Power Constructors, Inc. v. Taylor & Hintze, 960 P.2d 20, 31–32 (Alaska 1998) (noting that policy
favors requiring the defendant attorney to bear the inherent risks and uncertainties of proving
uncollectibility, because the need to determine collectibility arises only after malpractice has already
been proven against the attorney); Jourdain v. Dineen, 572 A.2d 1304, 1306 (Me. 1987) (declining
to adopt a collectibility rule as part of the plaintiff’s affirmative case, holding that “[b]ecause
uncollectibility of a judgment should be treated as a matter constituting an avoidance or mitigation of
the consequences of one’s negligent act, it must be pleaded and proved by the defendant”);
Teodorescu v. Bushnell, Gage, Reizen & Byington, 506 N.W.2d 275, 278–79 (Mich. Ct. App.
1993) (adopting the minority view “that collectibility is an affirmative defense” to a legal malpractice
claim that an attorney must plead and prove); Albee Assocs. v. Orloff, Lowenbach, Stifelman &
Siegel, 721 A.2d 750, 757 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999) (rejecting the “contention that the issue
of collectibility cannot be determined prior to entry of a judgment for a specific amount of damages”
and holding that the plaintiff may prove legal malpractice where the damages in the underlying suit
are “ascertainable enough”); Kituskie v. Corbman, 682 A.2d 378, 382 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996)
(adopting the collectibility requirement as an affirmative defense to be proven by the defendantattorney based on the reasoning that the twice-wronged legal malpractice “plaintiff should not have
the added burden of proving collectibility”).
58. See Power Constructors, 960 P.2d at 31 (“[P]olicy would seem to militate in favor of
requiring the malpractice attorney to bear the inherent risks and uncertainties of proving
uncollectibility.”).
59. Smith, 868 F. Supp. at 2.
60. E.g., McKenna, 720 N.Y.S.2d at 658 (asserting that despite recognized alternative views, the
majority of courts continue to place the burden of proving collectibility on the plaintiff in legal
malpractice cases).
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case share a similar proof requirement. Legal malpractice plaintiffs who
were defendants in the underlying lawsuit must also establish a meritorious
defense in order to show proximate causation.61 Specifically, courts have
required the plaintiff establish that he or she had a meritorious defense in
the underlying suit, and that but for the attorney’s negligence, there would
have been no judgment, or the judgment would have been for a lesser
amount.62 “A meritorious defense is one that, if proven, would cause a
different result upon retrial of the case.”63 Courts have reasoned that no
malpractice exists unless the lawyer’s negligence resulted in the loss of a
meritorious defense that would have made a difference in the underlying
litigation.64 The majority of states place the burden of proving a
meritorious defense in the underlying lawsuit on the legal malpractice

61. See Md. Cas. Co. v. Price, 231 F. 397, 402 (4th Cir. 1916) (explaining the plaintiff’s
burden of proof); Zarin v. Reid & Priest, 585 N.Y.S.2d 379, 381 (App. Div. 1992) (indicating the
plaintiff must prove that he or she would have had a meritorious defense in the underlying lawsuit);
Heath v. Herron, 732 S.W.2d 748, 753 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, writ denied)
(asserting that the former client needed to prove a meritorious defense that “would [have] cause[d] a
different result upon retrial of the case” (citations omitted)).
62. See Md. Cas. Co., 231 F. at 402 (concluding that the plaintiff’s complaint did not allege
facts sufficient to establish liability against the lawyer-defendant because it did not show that the
plaintiff could have avoided the judgment entered against him or her but for the alleged malpractice);
United Cmty. Church v. Garcin, 282 Cal. Rptr. 368, 373 (Ct. App. 1991) (holding that for the
attorney-defendant to be ultimately liable for professional negligence, the malpractice plaintiff must
prove that but for the attorney’s negligence, the plaintiff would not have had an adverse judgment
rendered against him or her because he or she had a valid defense); Sonnenschine v. Giacomo, 744
N.Y.S.2d 396, 397–98 (App. Div. 2002) (dismissing the plaintiffs’ legal malpractice complaint for
failure to state a cause of action where the plaintiffs made numerous allegations describing the
defendant attorneys’ negligence in causing their answer to be stricken, but failed to present any
argument or proof of the merits of plaintiffs’ defense in the underlying action); Zarin, 585 N.Y.S.2d
at 381 (applying the but for test, which examines “whether a proper defense would have altered the
result” of the underlying lawsuit, where the malpractice plaintiff was the defendant in the underlying
lawsuit (quoting Carmel v. Lunney, 511 N.E.2d 1126, 1128 (N.Y. 1987))) (citations omitted);
Heath, 732 S.W.2d at 753 (“In order to support a malpractice recovery against an attorney, it is
necessary that the client establish that he had a meritorious defense to the [underlying] suit . . . .”);
Sherry v. Diercks, 628 P.2d 1336, 1339 (Wash. Ct. App. 1981) (stating that proximate cause for a
legal malpractice action requires proof that but for the attorney’s negligence, the client would have
been successful in defending the underlying action or would have suffered a lesser judgment).
63. Heath, 732 S.W.2d at 753 (citing Martin v. Allman, 668 S.W.2d 795, 797 (Tex. App.—
Dallas 1984, no writ)).
64. See Md. Cas. Co., 231 F. at 402 (concluding that the declaration did not allege facts
sufficient to establish proximate causation because it did not show that proper prosecution of the case
would have resulted in no judgment or a judgment for a lesser amount); United Cmty. Church, 282
Cal. Rptr. at 373 (analyzing the lawyer’s actions using the but for test); Timothy Whelan Law
Assocs., Ltd. v. Kruppe, 947 N.E.2d 366, 373 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011) (“As defendant failed to
adequately plead proximate cause, we find that the trial court’s decision to dismiss his claim for legal
malpractice was not error.”).
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plaintiff.65
For example, in Timothy Whelan Law Associates, Ltd. v. Kruppe,66 a legal
malpractice plaintiff failed to plead that he would have successfully
opposed the temporary restraining order (TRO) entered against him if his
lawyers had properly filed an answer.67 The Illinois Court of Appeals held
that the plaintiff failed to adequately plead and prove proximate cause.68
Because the plaintiff failed to present evidence of how he would have
successfully defended against the issuance of the temporary restraining
order, he failed to show the TRO’s issuance was a result of the lawyer’s
negligence.69
The issue of proof of a meritorious defense often arises in the context of
a default judgment that was entered against the malpractice plaintiff in the
underlying lawsuit.70 Addressing this situation, the Fourth Circuit held
that if an attorney fails to appear in a lawsuit on behalf of a client, causing
a default judgment to be entered the client, it does not automatically
follow that the client suffered damages.71 The judgment may have been
warranted, and may ultimately have been entered, notwithstanding any
efforts by the attorney to prevent it.72 To prevail on a claim for legal
malpractice, the plaintiff must go a step further and prove that had the
lawyer executed a proper defense in the underlying lawsuit, the plaintiff
would have been successful.73
65. See Md. Cas. Co., 231 F. at 403 (stating that the burden to prove the damages that were
suffered based on a meritorious defense in the underlying lawsuit is on the plaintiff); see also George
S. Mahaffey, Jr., Cause-In-Fact and the Plaintiff’s Burden of Proof with Regard to Causation and
Damages in Transactional Legal Malpractice Matters: The Necessity of Demonstrating the Better Deal, 37
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 393, 407 (2004) (“The reason that the burden of proof is generally placed on
the plaintiff is because the plaintiff is asking the court to grant him or her relief.” (footnotes
omitted)).
66. Timothy Whelan Law Assocs., Ltd. v. Kruppe, 947 N.E.2d 366 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011).
67. See id. at 372 (“What is missing is any explanation of how plaintiff would have successfully
opposed the issuance of the TRO.”).
68. Id. at 373.
69. Id. at 372.
70. See Md. Cas. Co., 231 F. at 402 (“The averment is merely that the default judgment would
not have been rendered if defendants had not failed to appear . . . .”); Sherry v. Diercks, 628 P.2d
1336, 1339 (Wash. Ct. App. 1981) (stating that the principles of proximate cause require the
plaintiff to show that if the suit against him had been properly defended, the plaintiff would have
prevailed or at least achieved a more favorable outcome).
71. See Md. Cas. Co., 231 F. at 402 (reasoning that the court may have rendered the same
judgment against the client even if the attorney had appeared).
72. See id. at 403 (“[T]here is a difference between the case of an attorney who fails to do
anything for his client, and one who makes an inexcusable mistake in attempting to comply with
instructions . . . .”).
73. See id. at 402–03 (explaining the plaintiff’s burden of proving a meritorious defense to the
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V. THE “PAYABILITY” REQUIREMENT AND THE COMPETING VIEWS
The question arises as to whether damages for legal malpractice as a
result of an adverse judgment against the malpractice plaintiff should
include the amount of an adverse judgment that the plaintiff will never
have to pay. Discussion of a “payability” requirement to establish
proximate causation relates back to the competing views on the judgment
rule versus the payment rule.
A. Judgment Rule Versus Payment Rule
The debate regarding the judgment rule versus the payment rule
typically comes up in the context of the liability of an insurer for entry of a
judgment in excess of policy limits as a result of bad faith settlement
practices.74 In that context, under the majority judgment rule, the entry
of an adverse judgment is by itself sufficient to bring an action for breach
of duty, regardless of whether any money has been paid or the judgment is
ultimately collectible.75
The majority-view courts have expressed several reasons for adopting the
judgment rule.
First, the judgment rule discourages “bad-faith
[settlement] practices in the insurance industry by eliminating the insurer’s
ability to hide behind the financial status of its insured.”76 If the rule
required payment of the judgment or proof of the ability to make
payment, “an insurer may be encouraged to refuse to settle a claim merely
because the insured is insolvent[,]” discouraging the poor from using
insurance.77 “[T]he judgment rule prevents an insurer from benefitting
underlying lawsuit); see also George S. Mahaffey, Jr., Cause-In-Fact and the Plaintiff’s Burden of Proof
with Regard to Causation and Damages in Transactional Legal Malpractice Matters: The Necessity of
Demonstrating the Better Deal, 37 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 393, 406–07 (2004) (discussing the burdens
of proof on a plaintiff with regard to cause-in-fact damages in a transactional legal malpractice
action).
74. See Stanley v. Trinchard, 500 F.3d 411, 423–24 (5th Cir. 2007) (comparing views of other
jurisdictions with regard to the judgment rule in a legal malpractice case); Shipman v. Kruck, 593
S.E.2d 319, 326 (Va. 2004) (identifying issues concerning adoption of the payment rule versus the
judgment rule).
75. See Stanley, 500 F.3d at 424–25 (“[T]he viability of a legal malpractice claim should not
depend on the ability of the victim to satisfy all or part of a judgment against him.”); Gray v. Grain
Dealers Mut. Ins. Co., 871 F.2d 1128, 1131 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (acknowledging “a split of authority
among the states as to the extent of an insurance company’s liability to the assignee of its insured for a
claim above the policy limit,” but adhering to the majority judgment rule). But see Shipman, 593
S.E.2d at 325–27 (discussing the problematic nature in applying the payment rule of legal
malpractice actions).
76. Pistalo v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 983 N.E.2d 152, 157 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (quoting
Econ. Fire & Cas. Co. v. Collins, 643 N.E.2d 382, 385 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994)).
77. Id. (quoting Econ. Fire, 643 N.E.2d at 385).
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from poverty of an insured who has a meritorious claim but cannot first
pay the judgment imposed upon [him or her].”78 In addition, it would be
wrong for an insurer to ignore its responsibility to operate in good faith
with respect to its insured client merely because the client is insolvent.79
Finally, the payment rule, which adopts the opposite view, unfairly
assumes that the insolvent—or its estate, which may be insolvent at the
time the judgment is entered—will remain insolvent for the life of the
judgment.80 Despite these policy reasons to protect insured individuals,
courts have recognized that a bankrupt or insolvent insured “presents the
most difficult challenge to the integrity of the judgment rule.”81
The minority view favors the payment rule—also called the prepayment
rule—which provides that damages are limited to the amount of the
judgment paid or payable by the judgment debtor.82 For example, at one
time Virginia followed the payment rule.83 In Allied Productions v.
Duesterdick,84 based on the well-established principle that an attorney is
liable only for the injury actually suffered by the client, the Supreme Court
of Virginia held that “when a client has suffered a judgment for money
damages as the proximate result of his lawyer’s negligence such judgment
constitutes actual damages recoverable in a suit for legal malpractice only
to the extent such judgment has been paid.”85 In 2004, the Virginia
Supreme Court overruled Allied Productions, citing three perceived
problems with the payment rule.86 First, under the payment rule the
aggrieved client could intentionally delay the running of the statute of
limitations for its malpractice claim simply by deferring payment of the

78. Id. (quoting Econ. Fire, 643 N.E.2d at 385) (identifying further benefits of the judgment
rule).
79. See Carter v. Pioneer Mut. Cas. Co., 423 N.E.2d 188, 192 (Ohio 1981) (finding that the
judgment rule better serves the interest of justice).
80. See id. (comparing the effects of applying the payment rule with the effects of applying the
judgment rule).
81. Gray v. Grain Dealers Mut. Ins. Co., 871 F.2d 1128, 1131 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
82. See Levantino v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 422 N.Y.S.2d 995, 999 (Sup. Ct. 1979)
(characterizing the payment rule as the “earlier and now generally discredited view of damages in bad
faith cases”).
83. See Allied Prods. v. Duesterdick, 232 S.E.2d 774, 776 (Va. 1977) (“[W]e hold that . . .
such judgment constitutes actual damages recoverable in a suit for legal malpractice only to the extent
such judgment has been paid.”), overruled by Shipman v. Kruck, 593 S.E.2d 319 (Va. 2004).
84. Allied Prods. v. Duesterdick, 232 S.E.2d 774 (Va. 1977), overruled by Shipman v. Kruck,
593 S.E.2d 319 (Va. 2004).
85. Id. at 776.
86. See Shipman v. Kruck, 593 S.E.2d 319, 326 (Va. 2004) (reversing the appellate court due
to the attested problems with the holding that the payment rule applies).
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judgment.87 Second, the court found that “in a statute of limitations
context, [the payment rule] would work an injustice on attorneys who may
be forced to defend allegations of malpractice brought many years after the
alleged breach occurred, dependent entirely upon the ability or whim of
the complaining client to pay the resulting damages.”88 In addition, the
payment rule may lead to a situation where “the greater the injury
wrongfully inflicted, the less the liability of the wrongdoer.”89
Today, it is not clear whether any state strictly follows the payment rule.
However, several states have adopted a modified form of the payment rule.
In Frankenmuth Mutual Insurance Company v. Keeley,90 the Michigan
Supreme Court, in affirming the trial court’s decision that the insurer’s bad
faith did not cause the excess judgment entered against its insured, decided
to resolve the excess-judgment issue that had been presented in the case.91
Although the Michigan Supreme Court had endorsed the judgment rule in
its earlier opinion, it subsequently adopted a compromise between the
judgment rule and the payment rule as set forth by Justice Levin in his
dissent in the prior opinion.92 Specifically, Justice Levin in his dissenting
opinion proposed the following compromise:
[T]hat this Court accept the essence of the judgment rule by eliminating the
need to show partial payment [as a prerequisite to a lawsuit for bad-faith
settlement practices], but provide protection for insurers along the lines of
the prepayment rule by precluding collection on the judgment from the
insurer beyond what is or would be actually collectable from the insured.93

Justice Levin also advocated for a recovery to the extent that the insured
could show economic loss in the form of damaged credit or financial
consequences.94 Following a remand to the trial court, the Michigan
Supreme Court adopted this modified payment rule as the better measure
87. See id. (“[A]dherence to a payment rule would vest the aggrieved client with the power to
forestall the running of the statute of limitations by the deferral of payment . . . .”).
88. Id.
89. Id. (quoting Allied Prods. v. Duesterdick, 232 S.E.2d 774, 777 (Va. 1977) (Poff, J.,
dissenting)).
90. Frankenmuth Mut. Ins. Co. v. Keeley, 461 N.W.2d 666 (Mich. 1990).
91. See id. at 667 (affirming the trial court’s decision denying that any bad faith by the insurer
caused harm to the insured).
92. See id. (holding that Justice Levin’s dissent was the best approach to determine the issue of
whether insurers are liable in cases of excess judgment).
93. Frankenmuth Mut. Ins. Co. v. Keeley, 447 N.W.2d 691, 709 (Mich. 1989) (Levin, J.,
dissenting), withdrawn, 461 N.W.2d 666 (Mich. 1990).
94. See id. at 706 (“If Keeley could demonstrate that his credit had been damaged or he had
suffered financial ruin, then he should no doubt recover for such economic loss caused by breach of
contract.”).
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of an insurer’s liability for an excess judgment resulting from bad faith
settlement practices.95
New York has also adopted a modified version of the two competing
rules, depending on the circumstances in which the judgment rule or
payment rule may be applied.96 The New York county court in Levantino
v. Insurance Company of North America97 articulated the rule as follows:
1) [W]here the assured pays part of the judgment or is solvent enough to do
so at the time of the excess judgment, the judgment rule applies and he is
entitled to the full amount of the excess as his damages; 2) where he was
insolvent before the judgment and obtained a bankruptcy discharge after it,
he is not damaged and may not recover for it; and 3) where he was insolvent
or nearly insolvent prior to the judgment the jury must consider his past, his
prospects, and other economic factors and assess his damages.98

In adopting this modified rule, the New York court recognized that a
judgment debtor who was insolvent before the excess judgment was
entered, and subsequently obtained a discharge in bankruptcy for the
amount of the judgment, has not been harmed in the amount of the excess
judgment by the bad faith practices of the insurer.99
Courts have focused on several distinguishing factors in adopting the
judgment rule for bad faith insurance cases. First, bad faith actions against
an insurance company arise out of a contract where there is an attempt to
put the injured party back in its original position before the breach.100 In
addition, bad faith insurance cases involve a third party, the judgment
creditor, who was harmed by the acts or omissions of the insured.101 In
enforcing the judgment rule, there is an underlying assumption that the
“holder of the former judgment” will be a party to the subsequent bad
faith suit against the insurer or will otherwise seek to “protect his interests
prior to payment of the second judgment” such that the insured will not
receive a windfall.102 Finally, in the insurance context, there is a concern
95. See Keeley, 461 N.W.2d at 667 (adopting Justice Levin’s proposition of a hybrid of the
payment and judgment rules).
96. See Levantino v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 422 N.Y.S.2d 995, 999–1002 (Sup. Ct. 1979)
(discussing the circumstances giving rise to different applications of the judgment rule).
97. Levantino v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 422 N.Y.S.2d 995 (Sup. Ct. 1979).
98. Id. at 1002.
99. See id. at 1001 (declaring that being insolvent before judgment is rendered nullifies any
injury from the judgment).
100. See Carter v. Pioneer Mut. Cas. Co., 423 N.E.2d 188, 192 (Ohio 1981) (hesitating to
relieve an insurer from his or her contractual duty of good faith).
101. E.g., Levantino, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 997 (noting that the action against the insurer was
brought by the insured’s creditor).
102. See Hernandez v. Great Am. Ins. Co. of N.Y., 464 S.W.2d 91, 94 (Tex. 1971) (assuming
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that adoption of the payment rule will encourage bad faith settlement
practices by insurance carriers.103
B. McClarty v. Gudenau
In 1995, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Michigan decided a case that sparked discussion and controversy around
the country regarding whether courts should adopt a requirement similar
to the payment rule for legal malpractice cases involving an adverse
judgment against the former client.104 In McClarty v. Gudenau, a
Chapter Seven bankruptcy trustee brought a legal malpractice action “on
behalf of the Debtor and her bankruptcy estate” alleging malpractice in
connection with the lawyer’s representation of the debtor in a negligence
case.105 As a result of the underlying lawsuit, the debtor had a $1 million
judgment entered against her, which, after payment by the insurance
company, left her with $750,000 of personal liability.106 This “personal
exposure” caused the judgment debtor to file for bankruptcy, in which she
later received a discharge of the debt.107 The lawyer “[d]efendants moved
for summary judgment[,]” arguing that the debtor’s bankruptcy discharge
nullified her damage claim for $750,000 as part of the unsatisfied
judgment.108
The Michigan District Court recognized that the issue before it was one
of first impression and focused, for purposes of its analysis, on the
proximate cause element of a legal malpractice claim, which requires proof
of actual damages suffered by the wronged litigant.109 The court agreed
with the lawyer-defendants, holding that as a result of the discharge in
bankruptcy, “the [d]ebtor no longer suffer[ed] from the excess

the likelihood of a holder of a former judgment bringing an action to protect his assets.).
103. See, e.g., Pistalo v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 983 N.E.2d 152, 157 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012)
(“The rationale behind allowing full recovery to an insured who has not paid the excess judgment is
to prevent bad-faith practices in the insurance industry by eliminating the insurer’s ability to hide
behind the financial status of its insured.” (quoting Econ. Fire & Cas. Co. v. Collins, 643 N.E.2d
382 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994))).
104. McClarty v. Gudenau, 176 B.R. 788 at 789–90 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1995).
105. Id. at 789.
106. See id. (discussing the liability imposed on the plaintiff in the automobile negligence suit).
107. See id. (describing the “exposure which prompted [the debtor’s] filing of bankruptcy” and
the later discharge of the debt).
108. See id. at 789–90 (noting the defendant’s previously denied motion for summary
judgment and the defendant’s position).
109. See id. at 790 (acknowledging the “novelty of this issue” and later the need to prove
“actual damages suffered by the tort victim”).
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judgment.”110 Accordingly, the court held that the bankruptcy trustee,
standing in the shoes of the debtor, could not prove damages in the
amount of the excess judgment, because the debtor no longer owed
anything as a result of the bankruptcy discharge.111
The court supported its conclusion with an analysis on “the law the
Court and the parties have been able to find on the effect of a discharge on
legal malpractice damages available to a bankruptcy trustee . . . .”112 First,
in In re R.H.N. Realty Corporation,113 the Southern District of New York
held that where “a Chapter seven trustee brought suit against a partnership
seeking indemnification for a judgment owed by the debtor[,]” the trustee
did not have a valid indemnification claim because the debtor had not
paid, nor would he ever have to pay, the judgment in a no-asset case.114
The court noted that the trustee was “simply attempting to collect the
deficiency claim” for the benefit of the judgment debtor, which did not
come within the trustee’s duties under the bankruptcy code.115 Second,
the McClarty court cited Frankenmuth Mutual Insurance Company v.
Keeley, wherein the court adopted the modified judgment rule articulated
by the dissent in its earlier opinion, and held that “recovery against an
insurer for bad faith” settlement practices is “limited to the amount of the
judgment actually collectible against the insured[.]”116
Finally, the court analyzed a New York case wherein the court took a
similar position.117 In Murphy v. Stein,118 the plaintiff alleged that the
defendant attorney committed “malpractice by failing to detect [a]
discrepancy between the court’s memorandum decision and the judgment
submitted[,]” with regard to the income gained from the sale of his marital
property as part of his divorce.119 The judgment incorrectly ordered

110. Id. (citing 11 U.S.C. § 524(a) (2012)).
111. See id. (noting that “the [d]ebtor no longer suffered from the excess judgment” as a result
of the bankruptcy discharge).
112. Id.
113. In re R.H.N. Realty Corp., 84 B.R. 356 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988).
114. See McClarty, 176 B.R. at 790–91 (citing R.H.N. Realty Corp., 84 B.R. at 360–61)
(analyzing the holding in In re R.H.N Realty Corp., where a trustee did not have a valid claim for
indemnification of a judgment).
115. See id. at 791 (quoting R.H.N. Realty Corp., 84 B.R. at 361) (indicating that the collection
of a deficiency claim does not fall within a trustee’s duties under the bankruptcy code).
116. McClarty, 176 B.R. at 791 (citing Frankenmuth Mut. Ins. Co. v. Keeley, 461 N.W.2d
666, 667 (Mich. 1990)).
117. See id. (citing Murphy v. Stein, 549 N.Y.S.2d 53, 54 (App. Div. 1989)) (discussing other
forms of support for the proposition that a deficiency claim collection is not a function of a trustee).
118. Murphy v. Stein, 549 N.Y.S.2d 53 (App. Div. 1989).
119. Id. at 54.
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expenses to be incurred by the plaintiff’s income from the sale.120 Relying
on the flawed divorce judgment, the plaintiff sold his equity interest in the
house for $1,500.121 The plaintiff then filed for bankruptcy from which
he later received a discharge.122 In the subsequent malpractice action
against his divorce attorney, the plaintiff sought damages claiming he sold
his equity interest in the house for far less than it was worth based upon
the attorney’s error.123 The court held that as a result of the bankruptcy
discharge, the plaintiff had “not suffered the requisite ‘actual damages’” to
prove proximate causation.124 The court stated just the opposite—the
plaintiff suffered no damages as a result of the alleged malpractice because,
“by virtue of the sale of his equity interest”—in the amount of $1,500—
and the bankruptcy discharge—of approximately $21,000 in debts—the
plaintiff actually received a benefit in excess of “his alleged interest in the
marital premises.”125 The McClarty court held that these three cases
supported its holding that a “[d]ebtor’s discharge from bankruptcy
mitigated” the debtor’s damages for any malpractice by the lawyers.126
In reaching its decision, the McClarty court recognized there were a
couple of cases that could support the bankruptcy trustee’s position and
thus quickly distinguished those cases.127 First, in Camp v. St. Paul Fire
& Marine Insurance Company,128 St. Paul contended that its liability for
an excess judgment, as the result of bad faith settlement practices, was
extinguished by virtue of the insured’s discharge in bankruptcy from the
$3 million medical malpractice judgment entered against their doctor.129
The court rejected St. Paul’s argument on the grounds that “St. Paul’s duty
[of good faith] extended to the bankruptcy estate and the estate was
damaged by St. Paul’s failure to settle within the policy limits . . . .”130 In
particular, the court focused on language in the doctor’s insurance policy,
which stated St. Paul would still be obligated under the policy if the
insured went bankrupt, to support its finding that St. Paul “assumed a
120. See id. (acknowledging that the defendant attorney failed to correct the error made in his
requested judgment that the court followed).
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 55.
125. See id. (affirming summary judgment in favor of the defendant attorney).
126. See McClarty v. Gudenau, 176 B.R. 788, 791–92 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1995) (supporting
the notion that a bankruptcy discharge would mitigate a debtor’s damages for legal malpractice).
127. See id. at 792 (distinguishing cases that were arguably supportive of the trustee’s position).
128. Camp v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 616 So. 2d 12 (Fla. 1993).
129. Id. at 14.
130. Id. at 15.
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duty to the bankruptcy estate.”131 The McClarty court found specific
language in the insurance policy to be the “crucial distinction” between
Camp and the case before the court.132 In contrast to Camp, the lawyerdefendants in McClarty had in no way assumed a duty to the debtor’s
bankruptcy estate.133 Accordingly, while the excess judgment remained
with the bankruptcy estate, the trustee could not recover the excess
judgment as damages against the lawyer-defendants through an action
brought solely on behalf of the bankruptcy estate.134
The McClarty court also analyzed Green v. Welsh.135 In Green, the
Second Circuit allowed a tort claimant to pursue her negligence claim
against the discharged bankruptcy debtors, but the action was limited to
recovering a judgment against the insurance carrier.136 In making its
decision, the circuit court relied on the language in 11 U.S.C. § 524(a): “A
discharge in a case under this title—(1) voids any judgment at any time
obtained, to the extent that such judgment is a determination of the
personal liability of the debtor with respect to any debt discharged
. . . .”137 The purpose of the bankruptcy discharge is to give the debtor a
fresh start, but not to afford anyone else a similar benefit.138 The
McClarty court distinguished Green on the grounds that the extent of the
defendant-insurer’s liability was based on an amount set by an insurance
policy, as opposed to legal malpractice actions where the defendant-lawyer
is liable for the claimant’s actual damages proximately caused by the
lawyer’s negligence.139
The court in McClarty noted that its holding did not preclude the
bankruptcy debtor from recovering “damage for [harm to] her credit and
emotional injuries” as a result of filing for bankruptcy.140 Those are the
damages the debtor would be entitled to, in addition to the discharge, for a
131. Id.
132. McClarty, 176 B.R. at 792.
133. See id. (differentiating the instant case due to lack of an assumed duty or relationship
between the parties).
134. See id. (holding that the defendant attorney owed no duty to the plaintiff trustee relating
to any monetary judgment not in the plaintiff’s possession).
135. Green v. Welsh, 956 F.2d 30 (2d Cir. 1992).
136. See id. at 32 (“Green could resume her suit against the Welshes as long as it was directed
only at obtaining a judgment to be paid by the Welshes’ liability insurer.”).
137. Id. at 33 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 524(a) (2012)) (emphasis omitted).
138. See id. (stating that a bankruptcy discharge is only intended to benefit debtors).
139. See McClarty, 176 B.R. at 792 (“Green is different from this case, however, because the
extent of Defendants’ malpractice liability to the trustee as an ‘insurer’ of the Debtor is . . . the
Debtor’s actual damages—not an amount set in an insurance policy or other indemnity agreement.”).
140. Id. at 793.
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make-whole-type remedy.141 However, the court was simply unwilling to
ignore the bankruptcy filing and its discharge to determine the debtor’s
recoverable damages for the alleged malpractice.142 Thus, McClarty
stands for the proposition that a plaintiff may not recover the amount of a
judgment that has been discharged in bankruptcy and that the plaintiff will
never have to pay as a result as damages for a legal malpractice claim.
Since the Michigan court’s decision, McClarty has been distinguished as
a case discussing limitations on liabilities for debts owed to third parties.
For example, in McHale v. Silicon Valley Law Group,143 a 1031144
exchange company claimed damages of $18 million in cash inflows used to
close 1031 exchange transactions of new clients, which resulted in
insufficient cash flow to meet the commitments of subsequent 1031
exchangers.145 The law firm relied on McClarty and other third-party
liability cases to argue that those cash inflows did not result in any liability
to the plaintiff and that such liability had been extinguished as a result of
the entity’s filing for bankruptcy.146 The court found that the plaintiff
did have a liability to repay those funds and distinguished McClarty as a
case that discussed limitations on liabilities to third parties.147 In the
McHale case, the plaintiff owned the lost exchange funds and thus suffered
a distinct injury when he was stripped of those assets and could no longer
fulfill his obligations to the exchangers.148 Therefore, the court held the
141. Id.
142. See id. (underlining the Court’s unwillingness to ignore the bankruptcy discharge when
evaluating damages).
143. McHale v. Silicon Valley Law Grp., No. 10-CV-04864-JCS, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
100798, 2013 WL 3784349 (N.D. Cal. July 18, 2013).
144. Like-Kind Exchanges Under IRC Code Section 1031, IRS (last updated Aug. 3, 2012),
http://www.irs.gov/uac/Like-Kind-Exchanges-Under-IRC-Code-Section-1031 (“Whenever you sell
business or investment property and you have a gain, you generally have to pay tax on the gain at the
time of sale. IRC Section 1031 provides an exception and allows you to postpone paying tax on the
gain if you reinvest the proceeds in similar property as part of a qualifying like-kind exchange.”).
145. See McHale, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100798,. at *4–5, 2013 WL 3784349, at *2 (“The
parties have stipulated that 1031 Advance did not have sufficient assets remaining to meet the
obligations of the subsequent 1031 Advance exchangers or the other 1031 Debtors and their clients,
and that ‘1031 Advance had liabilities to repay those funds.’”).
146. See id. at *9-10, 2013 WL 3784349, at *3 (explaining that the defendant lawyer’s position
that liability for inflows had been extinguished due to the entity filing for bankruptcy).
147. See id. at *10, 2013 WL 3784349, at *3–4 (emphasizing that the plaintiff had an
obligation to pay debts to its own clients and that McClarty was distinguishable because that case
discussed limitations on liabilities to third parties).
148. See id. at *8, 2013 WL 3784349, at *3 (“[T]he trustee [did] not seek to recover money
owed to the other 1031 Debtors or their clients; at the time 1031 Advance filed for bankruptcy, it
had a deficit of approximately $31.2 million in exchange funds that it needed to close exchanges for
its own clients.”).
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plaintiff could offer evidence of the lost funds as damages for its legal
malpractice claim.149 Notably, the court in McHale did not determine
whether the law firm’s conduct was the proximate cause of the loss of the
plaintiff’s assets, but only whether the plaintiff could claim as damages the
lost assets and put on evidence related thereto.150
C. Stanley v. Trinchard
In 2007, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed a similar fact
pattern and rejected the McClarty court’s reasoning and decision in Stanley
v. Trinchard.151 Stanley has since become the seminal counterpart case to
McClarty on the issue of whether legal malpractice plaintiffs (or a
bankruptcy trustee standing in their shoes) may pursue a damage claim in
the amount of a judgment that was discharged in bankruptcy.152 In
Stanley, Hale, a Louisiana detective working for a Sheriff’s office, had a
multi-million dollar judgment entered against him as a result of a § 1983
civil suit.153 After a judgment creditor forced Hale into an involuntary
bankruptcy, he received a discharge of the bankruptcy and brought suit
against the lawyers who represented him in the § 1983 action.154 The
lawyer-defendants filed for summary judgment, arguing that as a result of
Hale’s discharge in bankruptcy, he could not prove damages for his legal
malpractice claim.155
Hale sought damages in the amount of the multi-million dollar
judgment entered against him, as well as general damages for “the physical
and emotional stress of [being in] trial; the shock of having [the] judgment
149. See id. at *12–13, 2013 WL 3784349, at *4 (holding that in a legal malpractice claim, the
plaintiff could present evidence to prove lost funds were proximately caused by the defendant’s
negligent acts).
150. See id. at *13, 2013 WL 3784349, at *4 (emphasizing that while the defendant had not
offered evidence of causation, this was a question of fact for the fact finder).
151. See Stanley v. Trinchard, 500 F.3d 411, 421 (5th Cir. 2007) (addressing whether the
trustee for Hale’s estate could pursue a malpractice action against the attorneys who represented Hale
in the prior case based on a judgment for which Hale had received a discharge in bankruptcy).
152. See id. at 425 (“[W]e hold that . . . [the debtor] had incurred a legal injury . . . sufficient
to allow [the trustee] to assert a legal malpractice claim . . . and that [the debtor’s] subsequent
discharge from personal liability for that judgment had no effect on the right and duty of the trustee
to pursue that claim.”).
153. See id. at 415–17 (summarizing the prior civil suit filed by a convicted murderer alleging
that exculpatory evidence had not been disclosed in his trial, which resulted in a $4,000,000
judgment against Hale).
154. Id. at 418.
155. See id. (explaining that the district court concluded “Hale’s bankruptcy discharge made it
impossible for Stanley to show that any damages resulted from the . . . defendants’ alleged
malpractice” and thus granted the defendants’ motions for summary judgment).
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rendered against him; and the humiliation” of having to file for
bankruptcy.156 Citing McClarty, the defendants argued that summary
judgment was proper because there was no injury to support a malpractice
claim as a result of the bankruptcy discharge.157 In response, the
bankruptcy trustee argued that the Fifth Circuit’s decision in In re
Segerstrom158 rejected McClarty.159
In earlier proceedings, the district court declined to follow McClarty
based on the Fifth Circuit’s decisions in In re Segerstrom and In re
Edgeworth,160 in which the court held that a “bankruptcy [discharge]
discharges only the debtor’s personal liability for his discharged debts but
does not extinguish the debt itself . . . .”161 Relying on this precedent, the
district court denied summary judgment on the grounds that Hale had
suffered no damages as a result of the discharge.162 Despite this ruling,
the district court then granted summary judgment in accordance with
Louisiana law because the reasons for the bankruptcy discharge were
indistinguishable from McClarty.163 In granting summary judgment
under Louisiana law, the district court noted that Hale’s bankruptcy
discharge relieved him of personal liability for the judgment entered
against him.164 Additionally, Hale had produced no evidence of any lost
assets or payments made as a result of the judgment entered against
him.165 Consequently, the district court held that Hale had not suffered
any kind of economic loss as a result of his lawyer’s alleged malpractice.166
156. Stanley v. Trinchard, No. 02-1235, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17682, at *31, 2005 WL
2037543, at *9 (E.D. La. Aug. 1, 2005), rev’d, 500 F.3d 411 (5th Cir. 2007).
157. See id. at *10, 2005 WL 2037543, at *3 (citing McClarty v. Gudenau, 176 B.R. 788, 790
(Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1995)) (supporting the view that a bankruptcy discharge bars a debtor from
recovering damages for a discharged judgment in a malpractice suit).
158. In re Segerstrom, 247 F.3d 218 (5th Cir. 2001).
159. See Stanley, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17682, at *10–11, 2005 WL 2037543, at *3
(outlining the trustee’s argument that the debtor’s discharge did not limit the right to bring a
malpractice suit and that the discharge does not eliminate the debt).
160. In re Edgeworth, 993 F.2d 51 (5th Cir. 1993).
161. Stanley, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17682, at *13, 2005 WL 2037543, at *3–4.
162. Id., 2005 WL 2037543, at *4.
163. See id. at *42–43, 2005 WL 2037543, at *13 (finding that the plaintiff failed to meet his
burden of proving the last element of his legal malpractice claim such that summary judgment in
favor of the defendants was proper).
164. Id. at *34–35, 2005 WL 2037543, at *11.
165. Id., 2005 WL 2037543, at *11.
166. Id. at *35, 2005 WL 2037543, at *11. In reaching its decision, the court cited Costello v.
Hardy in support of its holding. See id. at *32–34, 2005 WL 2037543, at *10 (citing Costello v.
Hardy, 864 So. 2d 129, 133 (La. 2004)) (explaining that in drafting a will for a son, the drafting
attorney negligently failed to include a $25,000 annual stipend the son intended to leave for the
mother). In Costello v. Hardy, through settlement of the suit to annul the will, which the attorney
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Furthermore, the court found no causal connection between the alleged
malpractice and Hale’s alleged emotional distress and mental anguish
claims.167 The Louisiana court held that because Hale could not meet his
burden of proof with respect to proximate cause and damages, summary
judgment was warranted for the defendants.168
In reviewing this decision, the Fifth Circuit cited bankruptcy law stating
that a bankruptcy trustee “may pursue any claims that are property of the
bankruptcy estate.”169 The bankruptcy trustee then stands in the shoes of
the debtor and “is subject to all defenses available against the debtor, and
must prove all elements that the debtor would be required to prove.”170
Because Hale’s legal malpractice claim accrued pre-petition, his
malpractice claim became property of the bankruptcy estate, and could
properly be pursued by the bankruptcy trustee on behalf of the estate.171
The Fifth Circuit recognized the Michigan Bankruptcy Court’s holding
in McClarty, but declined to follow it.172 Instead, the court looked to its
prior decision in In re Segerstrom as the proper authority on this issue.173
In In re Segerstrom, the court entered a judgment of $8.5 million against a
personal injury defendant involved in a car wreck.174 After the judgment
creditor filed an involuntary bankruptcy action against Segerstrom, the
court granted the trustee’s motion to hire special counsel to pursue a legal
malpractice claim against Segerstrom’s lawyers in a state court lawsuit.175
had allegedly negligently prepared, Mrs. Costello was entitled to a $25,000 annual stipend, which
compromised and discharged her claim for the $25,000 annual stipend that was allegedly omitted
from the will. Costello v. Hardy, 864 So. 2d 129, 138–39 (La. 2004). Because Mrs. Costello only
claimed damages for the annual stipend in the legal malpractice action, the court of appeals granted
summary judgment, which the Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed, in favor of the lawyer-defendants.
Id. at 139.
167. See Stanley, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17682, at *41, 2005 WL 2037543, at *13 (asserting
that because the trustee could not provide evidence of Hale’s emotional distress or mental anguish
resulting from the multi-million dollar judgment, Hale had not satisfied all the elements of a legal
malpractice claim).
168. Id. at *43, 2005 WL 2037543, at *13.
169. Stanley v. Trinchard, 500 F.3d 411, 418 (5th Cir. 2007) (citing 11 U.S.C. § 323 (2012)).
170. Id. (quoting In re Segerstrom, 247 F.3d, 218, 224 (5th Cir. 2001)).
171. Id. at 418–19.
172. See id. at 419–20 (holding that “a trustee of [a] bankruptcy estate of a discharged debtor”
cannot recover the amount of the judgment for which the debtor received a discharge as damages for
a legal malpractice claim. (citing McClarty v. Gudenau, 176 B.R. 788 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1995))).
173. See id. at 420 (noting how the facts in In re Segerstrom were parallel to the facts in the
present case).
174. See In re Segerstrom, 247 F.3d 218, 221 (5th Cir. 2001) (providing the background of a
car wreck case, which resulted in an excess judgment and an involuntary bankruptcy suit filed against
the defendant).
175. See id. at 221–22 (discussing the bankruptcy estate’s malpractice complaint “alleging
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Eight months after the bankruptcy filing, Segerstrom received a discharge
in the bankruptcy.176 This led the district court to grant the defendantlawyer’s motion for summary judgment for lack of proximate cause and
injury.177
The Fifth Circuit affirmed the summary judgment on lack of proximate
causation and injury on grounds unrelated to Segerstrom’s bankruptcy
discharge.178 Specifically, after declining to follow McClarty, the court
looked to “whether the [bankruptcy] estate has offered sufficient evidence
that Segerstrom, as opposed to her creditors, suffered injury in the
[underlying] litigation.”179 The court found that the bankruptcy estate
had failed to prove a meritorious defense that would have made a
difference in the underlying lawsuit or any injury to Segerstrom, to meet
its burden of proof on the third and fourth elements of its legal malpractice
claim.180 The Fifth Circuit discussed, as dicta, the law firm’s argument
that Segerstrom was not damaged in the amount of the judgment for
which she had received a discharge in bankruptcy.181 While not
controlling, the In re Segerstrom court cited its prior decision in In re
Edgeworth, holding that “a discharged debt continues to exist [thereafter]
and judgment creditors may collect from any other [liable] source.”182 It
also found the policy argument relevant in Edgeworth, that tortfeasors
should not be able “to escape liability simply based on the financial
negligence, gross negligence, and breach of fiduciary duty”).
176. Id. at 222.
177. See id. at 222–23 (explaining that the district court granted summary judgment in favor of
the defendants, because any negligence by the defendants “did not cause Segerstrom injury because
her personal liability on the state court judgment had been discharged”).
178. See id. at 227 & n.6 (expounding on the bankruptcy court’s failure to prove injury or
causation without considering bankruptcy proceedings). In the underlying lawsuit, Segerstrom, a
minor at the time of the car accident, made “the strategic decision to accept responsibility for the
accident . . . .” Id. at 226. The court found that the bankruptcy estate failed to produce any
evidence suggesting Segerstrom did not achieve the exact outcome she pursued in the litigation to
prove she had suffered any injury as a result of the alleged malpractice. Id. In addition, the
bankruptcy estate failed to prove that its alternative trial strategy would have been successful (the
meritorious defense requirement) in the underlying litigation to establish causation. Id. at 226–27.
179. See id. at 226 (disagreeing with the court in McClarty and considering whether the
individual’s estate suffered any injury).
180. See id. at 226–27 (reinforcing the fact that the estate had failed to prove their case).
181. See id. at 225 n.4 (refusing to adopt the district court’s holding that the bankruptcy
trustee would not have been able to prove damages as a result of the discharge of the debt).
182. See id. (citing In re Edgeworth, 993 F.2d 51, 53 (5th Cir. 1993)) (explaining that the
family of a deceased who had died under a doctor’s care could pursue a malpractice claim even
though the doctor had filed for bankruptcy and received a discharge); see also 11 U.S.C. § 524(e)
(2012) (“[D]ischarge of a debt of the debtor does not affect the liability of any other entity on, or the
property of any other entity for, such debt.”).
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misfortunes of the insured victims.”183
In Stanley, the Fifth Circuit noted that while the court was not strictly
required to follow its prior holding in In re Segerstrom, it made sense to do
so.184 In support of its decision, the court cited the following policy
reasons: “(1) it would be improper to excuse the malpractice liability of a
potentially negligent attorney because of the ‘financial misfortunes’” of his
former client, and (2) permitting a claim for legal malpractice to go
forward despite a “bankruptcy discharge would not threaten ‘the primary
purpose behind the discharge,’ i.e., avoiding financial harm to the
debtor.”185 Of significance, the Stanley court made a distinction between
the claim by Hale individually and the claim by the bankruptcy trustee on
behalf of his bankruptcy estate, describing it as the very distinction
underlying the court’s opinion in In re Segerstrom.186 Specifically, the
court held, “The fact that Hale was later discharged from personal liability
for his judgment debt had no legal effect on Stanley’s right and duty to
continue pursuing that claim on behalf of the bankruptcy estate.”187
Thus, Hale’s discharge of the debt, after the filing of the bankruptcy and
after the legal malpractice claim, had already transferred to the bankruptcy
estate upon the filing of the bankruptcy, and thus did not affect “the right
and duty of the [bankruptcy] trustee to pursue that claim.”188
Today, these two opinions—McClarty and Stanley—represent a divided
jurisprudence on this important issue for legal malpractice actions.
VI. AVOIDING MALPRACTICE IN A VACUUM: THE WISDOM OF
ADOPTING THE PAYABILITY REQUIREMENT
Proof of actual damages as a result of the attorney’s negligence is a key
element of a legal malpractice claim.189 Courts have stepped up the
burden of proof by requiring legal malpractice plaintiffs to provide
evidence of collectibility of the lost judgment in order to prevail.190 On
183. Segerstrom, 247 F.3d at 225 n.4 (quoting In re Edgeworth, 993 F.2d 51, 54 (5th Cir.
1993)).
184. See Stanley v. Trinchard, 500 F.3d 411, 420 (5th Cir. 2007) (clarifying that while this
court was not required to rule in the same manner as its earlier decision, there was no reason not to).
185. Id. at 420–21 (quoting In re Segerstrom, 247 F.3d 218 (5th Cir. 2001)).
186. See id. at 421 (separating the interests of the individual from those of the bankruptcy
estate).
187. Id. at 422.
188. Id. at 425.
189. See Jackson v. Urban, 516 S.W.2d 948, 949 (Tex. Civ. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1974,
writ ref’d n.r.e.) (requiring proof of a collectible award before the legal malpractice plaintiff could
succeed).
190. Gibson v. Johnson, 414 S.W.2d 235, 238–39 (Tex. Civ. App.—Tyler 1967, writ ref’d
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the defense side, the plaintiff must prove an available meritorious defense
in the underlying lawsuit that would have precipitated a different result
but for the lawyer’s negligence.191 However, in the latter situation, courts
need to go a step further. As the corresponding burden of proof to
collectibility, it seems only logical and fair that a legal malpractice plaintiff
who was a defendant in the underlying action (and is consequently now a
judgment debtor) should also have to prove payability of the adverse
judgment to recover the amount of the judgment as damages for legal
malpractice. In the legal malpractice arena, “mere negligence on the part
of an attorney is not sufficient to impose liability” upon him.192
Furthermore, such negligence constitutes “malpractice in a vacuum” when
considered without the actual damages suffered by the plaintiff.193
Rather, the policy behind the suit-within-a-suit doctrine is that a former
client will prevail in a legal malpractice action only upon proof that “the
attorney’s negligence ‘made a difference to the client.’”194 This relates
back to “the fundamental rules of damages,” that a wronged litigant may
not recover “damages in the absence of a showing with certainty that actual
damages were, in fact, sustained.”195 The client-plaintiff in a legal
malpractice action must show appreciable harm in order to recover.196
Thus, proof of collectibility, or on the flip side, payability, is a critical
component of establishing proximate causation for a legal malpractice
claim.
In requiring proof of collectibility, courts have recognized that it would
be inequitable for a malpractice plaintiff to obtain a judgment against the
lawyer greater than what the plaintiff could have recovered and put in his
or her pocket as a result of the underlying lawsuit.197 In the same light, it
n.r.e.) (holding that a client who sued his former attorney for malpractice for mishandling a prior
cause of action had the burden of proof to show he would have been successful in his prior suit and
that any judgment rendered would have been collectible).
191. See, e.g., Schneider v. Richardson, 411 A.2d 656, 658 (Me. 1979) (citing Sohn v.
Bernstein, 279 A.2d 529, 532 (Me. 1971)) (stating that in order to prevail in a legal malpractice
action, the plaintiff must prove a certain probability of success but for the attorney’s negligent actions
or lack thereof).
192. Id.
193. See id. (explaining why malpractice without damages or injuries is a fruitless cause of
action).
194. Best v. Rome, 858 F. Supp. 271, 277 (D. Mass. 1994) (quoting Jernigan v. Giard, 500
N.E.2d 806, 807 (Mass. 1986)).
195. Coon v. Ginsberg, 509 P.2d 1293, 1295 (Colo. App. 1973).
196. Kituskie v. Corbman, 682 A.2d 378, 380 (Pa. Super. 1996).
197. See id. (“The mere breach of a professional duty, causing only nominal damages,
speculative harm, or the threat of future harm—not yet realized—does not suffice to create a cause of
action for negligence.” (quoting Ammon v. McCloskey, 665 A.2d 549, 552 (Pa. Super. 1995))).
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would be inequitable for a judgment debtor turned legal malpractice
plaintiff to recover a judgment against his or her former attorney in an
amount greater than the plaintiff could have paid on the judgment.
Without requiring evidence of payability, the legal malpractice plaintiff has
the opportunity to obtain a windfall in the form of damages for a
judgment that he or she will never have to pay, as the result of a
bankruptcy discharge, insolvency, or other circumstances.198 With such a
lapse in the law, clients may be encouraged to allow big judgments to be
entered against them, with the comfort of knowing that they will never
have to pay the judgment, only to turn around and sue their lawyer for the
full amount.199
Requiring legal malpractice plaintiffs to prove payability is not at odds
with the judgment rule adopted by the majority of jurisdictions.200 The
judgment rule merely permits the legal malpractice plaintiff to bring an
action at the time of the entry of the adverse judgment, and allows the
statute of limitations to begin to run at that time.201 Although some
courts have extended its application, the judgment rule, in its original
form, does not provide that the amount of the judgment constitutes actual
damages for a legal malpractice claim.202
Moreover, the payability requirement does not mandate payment of the
underlying judgment as a condition precedent to bringing a legal
malpractice suit.203 This is what Stanley ultimately held.204 Just like in
the majority of judgment rule cases, the Fifth Circuit in Stanley did not
hold that the amount of the judgment for which the debtor received a
198. See McKenna v. Forsyth & Forsyth, 720 N.Y.S.2d 654, 657 (App. Div. 2001) (opining
that limiting legal malpractice damages to the collectible amount of the award is the best policy,
otherwise plaintiffs would obtain a “windfall opportunity to fare better as a result of the lawyer’s
negligence than he would have fared if the lawyer had exercised reasonable care” (quoting David A.
Barry, Legal Malpractice in Massachusetts: Recent Developments, 78 MASS. L. REV. 74, 81–82 (1993))).
199. See Klump v. Duffus, 71 F.3d 1368, 1374 (7th Cir. 1995) (claiming that a windfall
would occur in allowing the plaintiffs to sue their former attorneys for the full amount of damages
assessed to them, rather than the amount payable).
200. See id. (opinion that the purpose of a malpractice action is to restore the plaintiff to the
same position he or she was in prior to the attorney’s negligent action).
201. See id. at 1370 (noting the failure of Klump’s attorney to file his lawsuit within the statute
of limitations, drawing a malpractice action from Klump).
202. See Montfort v. Jeter, 567 S.W.2d 498, 500 (Tex. 1978) (“The Court, after full
consideration of the respective merits of the prepayment rule and the judgment rule, adopted the
judgment rule insofar as a tort action is concerned.” (citing Hernandez v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 646
S.W.2d 91, 94–95 (Tex. 1971))).
203. See, e.g., Stanley v. Trinchard, 500 F.3d 411, 421 (5th Cir. 2007) (ruling that the trustee
was not barred from bringing a malpractice claim despite Hale’s bankruptcy discharge).
204. Id. at 431.
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discharge in bankruptcy could be recovered as actual damages for the
trustee’s legal malpractice action.205 Rather, the court held that the
bankruptcy discharge did not preclude the trustee’s ability to pursue the
legal malpractice claim on behalf of the bankruptcy estate, and that the
judgment was some evidence of damages.206 Thus, under the payability
rule, an insolvent or bankrupt legal malpractice plaintiff may still bring a
legal malpractice claim to recover other damages, just not the amount of
the judgment that he or she will never have to pay, or in the foreseeable
future be able to pay.
In addition, several of the policy reasons for adopting the judgment rule
in bad faith settlement practices cases do not apply in legal malpractice
actions. Unlike insurance cases, where insurers may assume a duty of good
faith to third parties, the general rule is that lawyers owe a duty only to
their clients, and not to third parties with whom they have no attorney–
client relationship.207 Furthermore, the concern that the payment rule
will encourage insurers to engage in bad faith settlement practices does not
translate to the legal malpractice context.208 Unlike insurance cases,
where the insurer may be able to avoid payment under the insurance policy
by engaging in bad faith settlement practices, lawyers have nothing to gain
by committing malpractice. Even if the lawyer avoids a judgment against
himself because the plaintiff failed to prove payability of the underlying
judgment, a negligence finding against a lawyer can significantly impact his
reputation and his ability to earn a living, and may even pose a threat to
his bar license. Thus, regardless of whether courts enforce the payability
requirement, lawyers are already incentivized not to commit malpractice.
The payability requirement does not make the viability of a legal
205. See id. at 420–21 (noting that the court did not hold the amount of the judgment in
debtor’s bankruptcy discharge could be collected as actual damages).
206. Id. at 421.
207. See Giacometti v. Aulla, 114 Cal. Rptr. 3d 724, 727 (Ct. App. 2010) (citing the
traditional privity rule in California which states that a contract is a prerequisite to maintaining a
professional negligence claim); see also AG Capital Funding v. State St. Bank, 842 N.E.2d 471, 478
(N.Y. 2005) (holding that absent privity, a plaintiff must show “‘fraud, collusion, malicious acts, or
[some] other special circumstances’ in order to maintain a cause of action” for legal malpractice
(quoting Estate of Spivey v. Pulley, 526 N.Y.S.2d 145, 147 (App. Div. 1989))); McCamish, Martin,
Brown & Loeffler v. F.E. Appling Interests, 991 S.W.2d 787, 792 (Tex. 1999) (stating that an
attorney in Texas is not liable to non-client third parties for legal malpractice). But see Camp v. St.
Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 616 So. 2d 12, 15 (Fla. 1993) (finding an insurance carrier “assumed a
duty to the bankruptcy estate” in the event of a bankruptcy under the terms of the insurance policy).
208. See Pistalo v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 983 N.E.2d 152, 157 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (“The
rationale behind allowing full recovery to an insured who has not paid the excess judgment is to
prevent bad-faith practices in the insurance industry . . . .” (quoting Econ. Fire & Cas. Co. v. Collins,
643 N.E.2d 382, 385 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994))).
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malpractice claim turn on the ability of the former client to satisfy all or
part of the adverse judgment entered against them. Assuming the legal
malpractice plaintiff has sustained actual damages because of the adverse
judgment, the plaintiff will still be entitled to pursue a legal malpractice
claim for those damages.209 Courts adopting the judgment rule have
reasoned that the mere entry of an adverse judgment may cause damages in
the form of impaired credit, potential liens on property, and harm to the
judgment creditor’s reputation.210 We agree with this reasoning because
even with the payability requirement in place, the plaintiff may still recover
actual damages resulting from an unpaid judgment in the form of negative
effects on credit, liens on property, and non-exempt property being subject
to execution and forced sale.211 Thus, attorney tortfeasors will not be
allowed to escape liability because of the payability rule—they will simply
be held liable only for the actual damages sustained by the client.
Courts adopting the minority view with respect to collectibility have
expressed concern that the collectibility requirement ignores the possibility
that during the life of the judgment, the underlying defendant may come
into resources to pay all or part of the judgment against him or her.212 In
adopting a modified version of the judgment rule, New York courts have
held that where the legal malpractice plaintiff “was insolvent or nearly
insolvent prior to the judgment[,]” the fact finder may “consider his past,
his prospects, and other economic” considerations in assessing the
plaintiff’s actual damages related to the judgment.213 In a payability case
then, the fact finder could consider whether the circumstances are such
that the legal malpractice plaintiff may, during the life of the judgment, be
able to pay all or part of the judgment entered against him. Assuming the
legal malpractice plaintiff could prove with some certainty that he would
209. See McClarty v. Gudenau, 176 B.R. 788, 793 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1995) (noting the
district court’s holding that the plaintiff will be allowed to introduce proof of any injuries suffered as
a result of the alleged malpractice).
210. See Levantino v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 422 N.Y.S.2d 995, 999–1000 (Sup. Ct. 1979) (“The
mere entry of the excess judgment is viewed as causing legal damage since it impairs credit, subjects
the insured’s property to the lien, diminishes his reputation and future prospects . . . .”).
211. See McClarty, 176 B.R. at 793 (allowing the plaintiff to present proof of injury to, among
other things, her credit rating); Montfort v. Jeter, 567 S.W.2d 498, 500 (Tex. 1978) (remanding the
case with instructions for the lower court to hear the plaintiff’s argument for damages incurred);
Frankenmuth Mut. Ins. Co. v. Keeley, 447 N.W.2d 691, 706 (Mich. 1989) (supporting the
plaintiff’s ability to recover actual damages by showing that he or she suffered negative effects on
credit and other financial consequences).
212. See Smith v. Haden, 868 F. Supp. 1, 2 (D.D.C. 1994) (stating that the passage of time
can be significant because during the life of a judgment the plaintiff may come into resources with
which to pay the judgment against them).
213. Levantino, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 1002.
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come into resources in the near future from which he could pay all or part
of the judgment entered against him, the jury could consider that evidence
in awarding actual damages.214 Although this seems like an unlikely
scenario, allowing the jury to consider all of the relevant circumstances for
payment of the judgment at some future date gives the courts a way to deal
with this possibility when the evidence supports it.
In conclusion, to avoid a potential windfall for former clients, courts
must put legal malpractice plaintiffs to the test for proof of payability of
the judgment they seek to recover as damages from the attorney.

214. See id. (“Where the assured has meager assets and is unable to pay the judgment, the
Pattern Jury rule thus permits the jury to consider the age, economic status, economic prospects,
skills, health, and any other matters presently existing which would be reasonably predictive of the
insured’s economic future.”).

